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In November 2016, under the recently refurbished ceiling of Bogota´’s Teatro Colo´n,
Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, and the leader of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), Rodrigo London˜o (alias “Timochenko”), signed a peace
agreement to formally end the decades-long civil war in the Andean country. The text
of the peace agreement, if implemented, would constitute the most significant polit-
ical reform in the country since the ratification of the country’s 1991 constitution.
Among other things, the signed pact included substantial changes to the electoral
system, land redistribution, significant transformations to anti-drug policies, and a
revamping of the judicial system to cope with the demands of transitional justice. Af-
ter years of complex negotiations, Colombian society now faces the massive challenge
of successfully implementing the accord to make peace a reality.
This is not the first time that the country has attempted a peace-making process.
In Forgotten Peace, historian Robert A. Karl shows that politicians, rebel groups, and
civil society faced similar challenges after the civil war in the 1940s and 1950s - a pe-
riod in Colombian history commonly referred to as La Violencia (The Violence). The
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inception of a power-sharing agreement between Conservatives and Liberals, known
as the Frente Nacional (National Front) and the consolidation of local, informal peace
agreements were the main mechanisms designed to end the civil war and promised
democratic stability.
Finely researched and elegantly written, Karl’s book focuses on how the national
peace process was built from regional and local initiatives. Based on rich historical
sources, including documentation from Colombian governmental archives to the U.S.-
based National Security Archive, personal and private archives, films, and periodicals,
he reconstructs the evolution of such informal pacts that were negotiated in central
Colombia, especially in the southern portion of the department of Tolima, between
adversaries from different political parties in the late 1950s. These local peace pacts,
the so-called “paz criolla”(creole peace), were supported by regional and national
authorities, and some of them resulted in successful models of community leadership
in remote, underdeveloped rural areas. In their early stages, community-led peace
agreements were not only useful in reducing violence but also for delivering social
services and infrastructure programs in traditionally forgotten areas of the country.
Karl pays special attention to the effect that informal peace-making processes had
on the construction of new forms of citizenship, showing how local peace agreements
transformed the role of citizens in rural areas and their relationship with the Colom-
bian state. He also identifies a clear disconnect between national and regional politics
and underscores the consequences of that disconnect for the peace-building process
in Colombia, more broadly.
The stability of the regional peace agreements in the late 1950s and early 1960s
depended greatly on the central government’s capacity to effectively deliver public
policies. Rural communities in central Colombia demanded poverty alleviation poli-
cies, infrastructure projects, and loans, but especially, they needed clear institutional
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mechanisms to deal with land and property disputes. To solve the agrarian question
- that is, the lack of property rights and the unequal distribution of productive lands
- rural communities depended on intervention from the central government. Rural
communities also had clear notions about the responsibility and functions of the state:
conflict resolution, redistribution, and devolution of political and administrative roles.
Unsurprisingly, many who lived in the countryside highly valued government initia-
tives, like rehabilitation loan programs for both victims and perpetrators, land dis-
putes tribunals, known as tribunales de conciliacin y equidad, and truth commissions.
The first National Front president, Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962), seemed
to understand the importance of fulfilling the mandates of such policies, and he read-
ily implemented a series of initiatives that supported local peace pacts. For example,
he created a national commission for rehabilitation (Comisio´n Especial de Rehabil-
itacio´n) and a land reform agency (Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria).
However, the evolution of national politics in the early 1960s and problems within
the bipartisan power-sharing agreement weakened these policies. Budget allocations
for recently created agencies were reduced, and there was a significant rollback of
rehabilitation programs due to lack of funding and political conflicts between Con-
servatives and Liberals in Congress.
As Karl carefully shows, it was during this era that the armed conflict intensified
again. The weakening of the state’s presence in conflict-affected provinces and the
revival of old disputes in the national political arena crippled the paz criolla and
made peace-making increasingly susceptible to the interests of ex-combatants and
regional politicians, who were prepared to resume violent confrontations. These con-
ditions became even more prevalent after the election of the National Front’s second
president, Guillermo Leo´n Valencia (1962-1966), who decimated Colombia’s reformist
state. The Valencia administration led a conservative assault on rehabilitation and
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agrarian reform programs, renewed a technocratic push toward centralization, and al-
lowed anti-communist ideologies to flourish. In other words, Colombia’s pa´ıs pol´ıtico
(the country of political elites) turned away from the pa´ıs nacional (the country of
citizens and the provinces) once again.
The consequences of this anti-reformist movement were not minor. On one hand,
political elites in Bogota´ reinterpreted the nature of the armed conflict and the rural
frontier, coding rebel communities as bandits and creating a new national narrative
in which a war was being waged between such bandits and the state. On the other
hand, the growing absence of the central government in rural territories fed insurgent
narratives in the backcountry about state indifference to provincial needs. Unfulfilled
demands for rehabilitation programs and decentralization encouraged new radical
political projects, like the establishment of the independent republics of Marquetalia,
El Pato, and Riochiquito in central Colombia in the early 1960s, while also preparing
the groundwork for insurgent movements like the FARC and the National Liberation
Army (ELN).
In summary, Forgotten Peace is a brilliantly-researched and well-written book
on the nature of political and armed conflict in mid-twentieth century Colombia.
Karl’s book superbly shows that the 1965 military campaign against the country’s
independent republics ultimately transformed relations between Colombia’s urban
centers and its provinces, and between the state and the citizenry; it also transformed
the national understanding of the conflict. Most importantly, Karl’s book offers timely
lessons to understand Colombia’s current peace process and the challenges that lie
ahead for implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. Ultimately, Forgotten Peace
is a cautionary tale, warning us of the critical role that the state, parties, regional
actors, and intellectuals have in creating and maintaining peace in Colombia.
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